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Abstract
In this article we explore some of the ethical dimensions of using social media to increase the num-
ber of living kidney donors. Social media provides a platform for changing non-identifiable
‘statistical victims’ into ‘real people’ with whom we can identify and feel empathy: the so-called
‘identifiable victim effect’, which prompts charitable action. We examine three approaches to pro-
moting kidney donation using social media which could take advantages of the identifiable victim
effect: (a) institutionally organized campaigns based on historical cases aimed at promoting non-
directed altruistic donation; (b) personal case-based campaigns organized by individuals aimed at
promoting themselves/or someone with whom they are in a relationship as a recipient of directed
donation; (c) institutionally organized personal case-based campaigns aimed at promoting specific
recipients for directed donation. We will highlight the key ethical issues raised by these approaches,
and will argue that the third option, despite raising ethical concerns, is preferable to the other two.
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1 | BACKGROUND
Patients on the kidney transplant waiting lists face an uncertain future,
with long waiting times and extended periods of dialysis treatment
being typical experiences. Kidney transplantation is perceived to offer
significant benefit, in terms of both long-term survival1 and quality of
life2 for recipients and, because of its cost-effectiveness in comparison
to dialysis,3 to the welfare systems more generally. Many of those
listed for transplants will never be offered a kidney, and worldwide,
thousands of people die each year waiting for a kidney transplant. New
ways to increase the number of successful kidney transplants are con-
stantly being explored. One such way is to increase the number of
donors, which can be achieved by increasing the number of deceased
donors, or increasing the number of living donors.
The former is limited by the manner in which people die, what pre-
cipitated death and whether consent is obtained. Patients have to die
in relatively controlled circumstances for donation to proceed,4 and
some conditions, such as cancer, may be regarded as contraindications
for donation.5 Regardless of donation consent rates, relatively few peo-
ple die in circumstances compatible with donation. Medical advances
have made it possible to expand the eligibility criteria for donation, to
.......................................................................................................................................................................................
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1Oniscu, G. C., Brown, H., & Forsythe, J. L. (2005). Impact of cadaveric renal
transplantation on survival in patients listed for transplantation. Journal of
the American Society of Nephrology, 16(6), 1859–1865.
2Liem, Y. S., Bosch, J. L., & Myriam Hunink, M. (2008). Preference-based
quality of life of patients on renal replacement therapy: A systematic review
and meta-analysis. Value in Health, 11(4), 733–741, Wyld, M., Morton, R. L.,
Hayen, A., Howard, K., & Webster, A. C. (2012). A systematic review and
meta-analysis of utility-based quality of life in chronic kidney disease treat-
ments. PLoS Medicine, 9(9), e1001307.
3Barnieh, L., Gill, J. S., Klarenbach, S., & Manns, B. J. (2013). The cost-
effectiveness of using payment to increase living donor kidneys for transplan-
tation. Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology, 8(12), 2165–2173.
4Barber, K., Falvey, S., Hamilton, C., Collett, D., & Rudge, C. (2006). Potential
for organ donation in the united kingdom: Audit of intensive care records.
BMJ, 332(7550), 1124–1127.
5Israni, A., Zaun, D., Bolch, C., Rosendale, J., Snyder, J., & Kasiske, B. (2016).
Deceased organ donation. American Journal of Transplantation, 16(S2),
195–215.
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include older patients or those with certain morbidities that would pre-
viously have precluded donation. The so-called ‘marginal’ organs from
expanded criteria donors tend to produce worse outcomes for patients
than non-marginal organs,6 so although more patients receive trans-
plants, increased reliance on marginal organs is an imperfect solution to
the organ shortage.
The number of living kidney donors is less constrained by ability to
donate—the proportion of healthy adults who could potentially donate
a kidney is greater than the number of those who die in circumstances
compatible with donation. Instead, the number of people willing to
donate is the limiting factor. This is unsurprising—a healthy person may
be reluctant to undergo surgery that is of no clinical benefit to them,
and the majority of living donors, in most countries, donate to their
family or close friends. The immediate risk of mortality associated with
living kidney donation (LKD) is very low (one study suggests 3.1 deaths
per 10,000 donors in the 90 days following donation7), but it is none-
theless a greater risk than not donating. There are also risks of morbid-
ities (including a greater risk of end-stage renal disease8), and there are
the burdens of donation (potentially loss of income, discomfort, and so
forth) to consider. Moreover, people may not be aware of the need for
more kidney donors, or that they could be a living donor, or they may
regard the shortfall in kidneys as somebody else’s problem.
Kidneys from living donors tend to produce better transplant out-
comes than kidneys from deceased donors,9 and the large pool of
potential donors means that the benefits of promoting living donation
would be significant for recipients. In the United Kingdom, National
Health Service Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) is responsible for policy
in relation to transplantation. NHSBT has published a strategy docu-
ment for increasing LKD, outlining several goals and outcomes and
how these will be achieved.10 Its key aims are as follows:
1. To increase living donation kidney transplantation (LDKT) activity
for both adult and paediatric recipients, ensuring that donor safety
and welfare is consistently sustained through best clinical practice.
2. To maximize patient benefit by ensuring that all suitable recipients
have equity of access to LDKT and that the principle of ‘transplant
first’ is embedded in best clinical practice across the United
Kingdom.
3. To maximize the opportunities for suitable donors and recipients
to contribute to and benefit from the shared living donor pool by
ensuring that the National Living Donor Kidney Sharing Schemes
are both clinically and cost-effective.
As the immediate risks associated with LKD have decreased, the use of
living donors has apparently become more acceptable, particularly where
kidneys are donated to close family members.11 ‘Altruistic’ LKD, where
the donor is not related to the recipient, nor a friend of long-standing,
remains controversial,12 with concerns raised about the motivations of
people willing to undergo surgery in order to help strangers, the extent to
which donation could be in a healthy person’s best interests, and corre-
spondingly whether participation in living donation contravened the pri-
mary duty of doctors to ‘do no harm’. The number of altruistic donations
is generally increasing, and the fact that altruistic LKD no longer requires
additional psychiatric assessment,13 and is mentioned in NHSBT strategy,
suggests that it is becoming less controversial.
Exposing healthy people to any risk seems non-ideal when there is
an adequate alternative that exposes them to no risk. So although in
this article we will explore how social media could be used to increase
rates of LKD, we do so on the assumption that significant efforts
should also be made to increase deceased donation with the ultimate
goal being to arrive at a situation where LKD is unnecessary. The
NHSBT strategy presupposes that it is currently desirable to increase
rates of LKD, so in this article we explore the role of social media in
achieving this aim.
2 | MEDIA CAMPAIGNS AND SOLICITING
EMPATHY
Given the potential risks and burdens, becoming a living donor requires
a greater degree of motivation than registering a desire to be a donor
after one’s death. The promotion of living donation to help a stranger
may therefore require more than simply raising awareness; and may
also need to provide an individual with sufficient motivation to volun-
teer. Joining a deceased organ donor register (ODR) commits one to
being a ‘hypothetical’ organ donor; most people who join will never go
on to donate organs because so few will die in circumstances compati-
ble with donation. When one volunteers for LKD, there is a good
chance that the offer will be taken up. To be effective, therefore, the
promotion of living donation must not just generate support for a wor-
thy cause, but ensure that this support is followed up with a donation.
6Saidi, R., Elias, N., Kawai, T., Hertl, M., Farrell, M. L., Goes, N., . . . Ko, D.
S. (2007). Outcome of kidney transplantation using expanded criteria
donors and donation after cardiac death kidneys: Realities and costs.
American Journal of Transplantation, 7(12), 2769–2774. Aubert, O., Kamar,
N., Vernerey, D., Viglietti, D., Martinez, F., Duong-Van-Huyen, J.-P., . . .
Loupy, A. (2015). Long term outcomes of transplantation using kidneys
from expanded criteria donors: Prospective, population based cohort
study. BMJ, 351, h3557.
7Segev, D. L., Muzaale, A. D., Caffo, B. S., Mehta, S. H., Singer, A. L., Taranto,
S. E., . . . Montgomery, R. A. (2010). Perioperative mortality and long-term
survival following live kidney donation. JAMA, 303(10), 959–966.
8Muzaale, A. D., Massie, A. B., Wang, M.-C., Montgomery, R. A., McBride,
M. A., Wainright, J. L., & Segev, D. L. (2014). Risk of end-stage renal disease
following live kidney donation. JAMA, 311(6), 579–586.
9Matas, A., Smith, J., Skeans, M., Thompson, B., Gustafson, S., Stewart, D.,
. . . Kasiske, B. L. (2015). Optn/srtr 2013 annual data report: Kidney.
American Journal of Transplantation, 15(S2), 1–34.
10NHS Blood and Transplant. (2014). Living donor kidney transplantation
2020: A UK strategy. Retrieved from http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/download/
board_papers/may14/Living-Kidney-Donor-transplantation-2020-A-UK-
Strategy.pdf
11Live Organ Donor Consensus Group. (2000). Consensus statement on the
live organ donor. JAMA, 284, 2919–2926.
12Truog, R. D. (2005). The ethics of organ donation by living donors. New
England Journal of Medicine, 353(5), 444–446.
13Human Tissue Authority. (2015). Guidance to transplant teams and inde-
pendent assessors. Retrieved from https://www.hta.gov.uk/sites/default/files/
Guidance_to_Transplant_Teams_and_Independent_Assessors%20(1)_0.pdf
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Throughout this article we will draw a distinction between two
broad approaches to promoting LKD. First, the ‘awareness-raising’
approach, based on the provision of generalized information and statis-
tics regarding the need for, and benefits of, organ donation. Second, the
‘personalized’ approach, where there is a much greater emphasis on a
specific patient’s need for a transplant and a potential donor’s ability to
help that specific person. Awareness-raising has long been the approach
used to promote deceased donation. This has generally taken the form
of campaigns, where, via various channels, the public are told about the
number of people waiting for transplants and the benefits that organ
donation can provide. Awareness-raising via delivery of statistics and
education has not resulted in sufficient kidney donations for everyone
who needs one. A more personalized approach has also been used, but
has proven controversial. The 2008 ‘Kill Jill’14 campaign in Scotland was
controversial in part because it traded on emotion, using an apparently
identifiable individual and giving the audience 20 s to decide whether or
not to save her. Such advertising efforts have generally focussed on
increasing rates of deceased donation, but NHSBT’s new strategy to pro-
mote living donation signifies a departure from this.
Some organ donation campaigns have featured individual ‘case stud-
ies’ of people waiting for transplants, explaining their situations and high-
lighting the benefits that a transplant could provide—sometimes called
‘stories of hope’.15 The use of case studies is presumably intended to
appeal to people by making the human impact of the organ shortage
clearer, with the aim of generating empathy in order to motivate people
to take action to help. ‘Empathy’ can describe many complex phenomena,
but is most commonly used to refer to ‘affective empathy’, defined as
‘feeling the way another feels, or having congruent emotion, because the
other feels that way’.16 This form of empathy includes the perspective-
taking common to other forms (e.g., cognitive empathy), but is distinct by
virtue of the emotional reaction to the assumed mental state of another.
The empathy–altruism hypothesis widely described and evidenced in
psychological literature suggests that empathic concern for another can
lead to altruistic motivation to further that other’s welfare.17 Although
the precise nature of the altruism that motivates organ donation is
debated,18 it is reasonable to assume that the motivation behind most
living donation is at least partly other-regarding, so if empathy can result
in other-regarding behaviour, one can reasonably speculate that increas-
ing the empathy felt for potential kidney recipients could lead to an
increased number of kidney donations.
Moreover, although the concept remains disputed, some psycho-
logical research suggests the existence of an ‘identifiable victim
effect’,19 where people act differently towards identifiable victims than
to non-identified ‘statistical victims’. Considering the perspectives of
others is a necessary precondition for empathic emotional responses to
situations,20 and it is easier to consider or assume the perspective of
another person when they are an identified individual, rather than a
mere statistic. It has been claimed that ‘[i]dentifiable victims seem to
produce a greater empathic response, accompanied by greater willing-
ness to make personal sacrifices to provide aid’.21 One example of this
effect is the response to photos of the drowned Syrian refugee child,
Aylan Kurdi, which ‘went viral’ on social media.22 Although the refugee
crisis had been ongoing for some time prior to Aylan’s death, and it
was widely known that many people, including children, were dying
while trying to flee to safety, the widespread publication of photos
with an identifiable victim resulted in a notable (short term, at least)
change in attitudes from the public, the press, and politicians. One can
appeal to people by providing facts, figures, and impartial generalized
reports, but something that prompts a stronger and immediate emo-
tional reaction may be more effective at motivating them to provide a
solution. There is a scarcity of empirical research on this approach
within the context of organ donation,23 but using ‘identifiable victims’
within a personalized approach to promoting donation may therefore
be an effective way to increase LKD.
3 | IS THE PERSONALIZED APPROACH
MANIPULATIVE?
Appealing to emotion rather than directly to people’s rational capacities
may raise concerns about manipulation, but allowing emotion to play a
motivating role in donation is nothing new. Motivation for living dona-
tion between family members, for instance, is likely to involve a
14Scottish Government. (2008). Kill jill - Organ donation. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v5raMabDzN12s
15Organ Donation Scotland. (2016). Stories of hope. Retrieved from https://
www.organdonationscotland.org/discuss-share/stories-of-hope. Donate Life -
North Carolina. (2016). Stories of hope. Retrieved from https://www.donateli-
fenc.org/stories-hope. United Network for Organ Sharing. (2016). Stories of
hope. Retrieved from https://www.unos.org/transplantation/stories-of-hope.
16Kauppinen, A. (2014). Empathy, emotion regulation and moral judgment. In
H. L. Maibom (Ed.), Empathy and morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17Batson, C. D. (2011). Altruism in humans. New York: Oxford University
Press. Toi, M., & Batson, C. D. (1982). More evidence that empathy is a source
of altruistic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43(2), 281.
Feigin, S., Owens, G., & Goodyear-Smith, F. (2014). Theories of human altru-
ism: A systematic review. Annals of Neuroscience and Psychology, 1(1), 1–19.
18Moorlock, G., Ives, J., & Draper, H. (2014). Altruism in organ donation: An
unnecessary requirement? Journal of Medical Ethics, 40(2), 134–138,
Saunders, B. (2012). Altruism or solidarity? The motives for organ donation
and two proposals. Bioethics, 26(7), 376–381, Wilkinson, T. (2007). Racist
organ donors and saving lives. Bioethics, 21(2), 63–74.
19Small, D. A., & Loewenstein, G. (2003). Helping a victim or helping the vic-
tim: Altruism and identifiability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26(1), 5–16.
20Kogut, T., & Ritov, I. (2005). The “identified victim” effect: An identified
group, or just a single individual? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18
(3), 157–167.
21Jenni, K., & Loewenstein, G. (1997). Explaining the identifiable victim
effect. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 14(3), 235–257.
22Smith, H. (2015). The guardian - Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy
show tragic plight of refugees. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-
plight-of-refugees.
23Some research has found that providing anonymized demographic charac-
teristics of potential organ recipients increased likelihood to register as a
deceased donor (see: Singh, M., Katz, R. C., Beauchamp, K., & Hannon, R.
(2002). Effects of anonymous information about potential organ transplant
recipients on attitudes toward organ transplantation and the willingness to
donate organs. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 25(5), 469–476), but we are
unaware of research relating to living donation.
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significant emotional component.24 The same is also true when deci-
sions are made by families in relation to deceased donation; there is no
requirement that these decisions must be made completely rationally,
absent emotion. Emotional responses may even sometimes promote
rational decision-making. Feeling distressed because another person
feels distressed, for example, could prompt appropriate other-regarding
concern.25 Despite this, deliberately provoking an emotional reaction
to motivate living donation may be different from allowing emotion to
play a role in donation. It is generally accepted that a decision to
become a living donor should be informed and made freely without
coercion, and this may appear to discount intentional manipulation of
emotions.
Any marketing material designed to promote organ donation is
attempting to make people act in a certain way, but this is not always
ethically problematic. Black and Forsberg suggest that objections on
the grounds of manipulation comprise two claims. First, a descriptive
claim that someone induces someone else to do something. And sec-
ond, an evaluative claim that this is done in an unethical way.26 So
while advertising for organ donors is descriptively manipulative—as
highlighted by Black and Forsberg, it would be extremely wasteful to
use resources if the aim were not to change behaviour27—it is not nec-
essarily manipulative in the evaluative sense. For the purposes of this
discussion, we will assume that something is manipulative in the eval-
uative sense if it significantly undermines autonomy.28 The important
question, therefore, is whether donation influenced, in part, by emotion
can be considered sufficiently autonomous.
Although there are many competing accounts of autonomy, com-
mon to all of them is a general sense of self-governance, so external
influence is naturally likely to be in some tension with this. Blumenthal-
Barby presents a schema of influence, including (ordered from the least
to the most morally problematic) (a) reason and argument, (b) non-
argumentative influence (reason-bypassing type), (c) non-argumentative
influence (reason-countering type), (d) omission, and (e) force or severe
threats. The mid-point, ‘non-argumentative influence (reason-counter-
ing type)’, is defined as ‘influence that operates by countering a per-
son’s reasoning capacities, with examples including social norms/
pressures, inducing affective states, playing on desires’.29 A single act
of influence can fall into multiple categories, but a personalized
approach designed to prompt empathic responses could be classified
as a reason-countering type of non-argumentative influence. Relation-
ships between reasons, emotion and autonomy are widely debated
within philosophy, but it has been suggested that non-argumentative
influence compromises some conceptions of autonomy.30 Although it
seems unlikely that appealing to empathy to promote organ donation is
coercive, as no obvious restrictions are placed on a potential donor’s
choices, influencing people in this way could be considered to compro-
mise their autonomy to a lesser extent.
Faden, Beauchamp, and King argue that the extent to which a per-
son’s autonomy is compromised depends on how difficult the manipu-
lated person finds it to resist, and how much the non-rational influence
interferes with the manipulated person’s substantial understanding of
the issue at hand.31 In the case of organ donation messages, an appeal
to emotions such as empathy can be considered to ‘direct the agent’s
attention towards a set of options and make them salient’,32 rather
than directing someone down an entirely manipulated pathway. One
remains free to deliberate and reflect upon the information provided,
and to decide for oneself which course of action to take without exter-
nal pressure. Even if one’s motivation to initially come forward as a
potential donor was prompted solely by a spontaneous and uncontrol-
lable outpouring of empathic emotion, the protracted process of work-
up for donation makes it unlikely that one would get to the point of
donating without reflecting on one’s decisions. For these reasons, using
a personalized approach and prompting empathic responses with the
aim of promoting organ donation does not seem unduly manipulative.
Similar claims have been defended elsewhere in the context of famine
relief.33 This is not to say that such personalized appeals could not be
manipulative (putting a seriously ill patient and their distressed family
in the same room as a potential donor and asking the potential donor
to donate might quite rightly be considered manipulative) but we will
only be discussing options at the other end of the spectrum.
4 | SOCIAL MEDIA
The last decade has seen the rapid increase in popularity of social
media. Sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have provided
platforms for individuals to share their lives with friends and strangers
alike. The facility to share all facets of one’s life has created opportuni-
ties for individuals to draw attention to negative as well as positive life
events and experiences. Social media campaigns have proved to be an
effective way of generating support for causes, by both individuals and
organizations. Crowd-funding, for example, is used extensively by
patients in the United States to raise funds to pay for expensive medi-
cal treatment not covered by insurance.34 Social media has become
very effective at generating groundswell of support, and terms such as
‘going viral’ illustrate how quickly support can build. Given this, it is24Crouch, R. A., & Elliott, C. (1999). Moral agency and the family: The case
of living related organ transplantation. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare
Ethics, 8(3), 275–287.
25We thank an anonymous reviewer for this helpful point.
26Black, I., & Forsberg, L. (2014). Would it be ethical to use motivational
interviewing to increase family consent to deceased solid organ donation?
Journal of Medical Ethics, 40, 63–38.
27Ibid.
28Blumenthal-Barby, J. (2012). Between reason and coercion: Ethically per-
missible influence in health care and health policy contexts. Kennedy
Institute of Ethics Journal, 22(4), 345–366.
29Ibid: 349.
30Dworkin, G. (1988). The theory and practice of autonomy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Noggle, R. (1996). Manipulative actions: A con-
ceptual and moral analysis. American Philosophical Quarterly, 33(1), 43–55.
31Faden, R. R., Beauchamp, T. L., & King, N. M. (1986). A history and theory
of informed consent. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
32Tappolet, C. (2006). Autonomy and the emotions. European Journal of
Analytic Philosophy, 2(2), 45–59.
33Noggle, op. cit. note 30.
34Sisler, J. (2012). Crowdfunding for medical expenses. Canadian Medical
Association Journal, 184(2), E123–E124.
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unsurprising that transplant authorities and individual patients make
use of social media in an attempt to generate more organ donations.
Various Facebook pages have been dedicated to campaigns in
transplantation. Facebook has the facility for registered donors to share
their organ donor status with their friends via their profile.35 More
recently, organ donation has been promoted using the dating app, Tin-
der.36 Organizations, as well as individuals, have seized the opportunity
offered by the immense audience.37 Their efforts have largely focussed
on promoting deceased donation, but social media can be used in
many ways to promote living organ donation; some of which raise
awareness, and others use more personalized approaches.
Against this background, we will now explore three ways in which
social media could be used to the advantage of the identifiable victim
effect by using personalized approaches in order to promote LKD. Our
discussion is based on two key assumptions, introduced earlier:
1. That invoking empathy can lead to altruistic actions, such as
donating a kidney.
2. That people are more likely to act altruistically towards an identifi-
able victim than a statistical victim.
Approach 1 Institutionally organized case study-based
campaign to promote non-directed altruistic donation.
The use of stories of identifiable patients who have been helped by
(or who died needing) a donated organ are used to promote donation
in many countries.38 By outlining the experiences of people before and
after transplantation, the need for and benefits of organ donation are
highlighted in a way that relates to a specific individual and encourages
empathy. Although they provide an identifiable victim, the resulting
donations are not for the person in the adverts (as, in most cases, they
have already received a transplant or died). Instead, the patient is fea-
tured as an illustration of the good that transplantation can achieve, or
the harm that it can prevent. The donated organs are allocated accord-
ing to the national allocation models, balancing criteria such as urgency,
benefit, and waiting time.
This approach to promoting organ donation raises relatively few
ethical issues in its current form, and the same would be true if this was
transferred over to social media. Nonetheless, transplantation is ‘mar-
keted’ with a particularly positive spin. The types of people featured in
these case studies are ethnically diverse, presented as having positive
attributes (active, hardworking good parents) and illnesses unrelated to
lifestyle. Understood as objective awareness, raising this could be
regarded as deceptive, as it attempts to influence behaviour by
providing potentially misleading information: If someone chooses to be
a donor on the understanding that their donation is going to help some-
one similar to the patients featured in the marketing materials, they may
be concerned to learn that their donation has been allocated to some-
one who they would not be so keen to help. However, understood as a
mechanism for evoking general empathy for the plight of those in need
of organs, it seems less deceptive, since most people waiting for trans-
plants will be experiencing relatively similar plights. But then as a per-
sonalized approach taking advantage of the identifiable victim effect,
this approach falls someway short. Although the patients featured in
marketing materials are identifiable and may invoke a sense of empathy,
donors are still being asked to help non-identified victims, so it seems
likely that some of the identifiable victim effect may be lost.
Approach 2 Case study-based campaigns organized by
individuals to promote directed altruistic donation.
This approach is becoming popular on Facebook and dedicated web-
sites such as matchingdonors.com.39 Pages and profiles can be set up
(often by the patients themselves, but sometimes by their family or
friends), which tell a patient’s story with the aim of prompting a dona-
tion specifically to that individual. Such pages often feature detailed
descriptions of the patient, their illness, and their life history, and the
more successful pages are presented in a way that tugs at the viewer’s
heartstrings with the aim of eliciting empathy. Key aspects of their lives
are brought to the fore in an apparent attempt to resonate with ‘brows-
ers’ with shared values or interests. For instance, many pages display
photos of adult patients surrounded by their children and grandchildren,
with accompanying text highlighting how important they are to each
other—something that people with close family members can relate to.
The success of this general approach is evidenced by a steady stream of
directed altruistic donors in the United States, where it has been permit-
ted for a long time. The approach is newer in Europe, but has resulted in
donations in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Several
European countries, including France, Germany, and Greece, prohibit
non-directed altruistic donation, and these same countries do not cur-
rently permit directed altruistic donation either.40
This form of directed living donation (also known as publically soli-
cited donation [PSD]) has raised concerns. The (largely) European net-
work Ethical, Legal, and Psychological Aspects of Transplantation’s
(ELPAT) position paper highlights potential for unfair allocation, dam-
aged public perceptions, and links to the organ trade.41 Similar con-
cerns have been raised by others,42 but such solicitation is legal in the
35Facebook. (2016). Share your organ donor status. Retrieved from https://
www.facebook.com/help/416967021677693/
36BBC News. (2015). NHS hooks up with dating app Tinder on organ dona-
tions. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-35070858
37Transplant Australia. (2016). Transplant Australia Facebook page. Retrieved
from https://www.facebook.com/transplantaustralia/
38NHS Blood and Transplant. (2016). People who are waiting for a transplant.
Retrieved from https://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/real-life-stories/people-
who-are-waiting-for-a-transplant/
39MatchingDonors. (2016). MatchingDonors home page. Retrieved from
http://matchingdonors.com/life/index.cfm
40Lopp, L. (2013). Regulations regarding living organ donation in Europe.
Berlin: Springer.
41Frunza, M., Van Assche, K., Lennerling, A., Sterckx, S., Citterio, F.,
Mamode, N., . . . Dor, F. J. (2015). Dealing with public solicitation of organs
from living donors—An elpat view. Transplantation, 99(10), 2210–2214.
42Neidich, E., Neidich, A., Cooper, J., & Bramstedt, K. A. (2012). The ethical
complexities of online organ solicitation via donor–patient websites: Avoid-
ing the “beauty contest”. American Journal of Transplantation, 12(1), 43–47,
Moorlock, G. (2015). Directed altruistic living donation: What is wrong with
the beauty contest? Journal of Medical Ethics, 41(11), 875–879.
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United Kingdom (provided there is no payment involved), and the UK’s
Human Tissue Authority has recently included guidance on their own
website for potential donors and recipients thinking of using social
media and dedicated websites.43 The potential negative dimensions of
this form of donation have to be balanced against potential benefits to
recipients of increasing the numbers of successful transplants, which
could be significant if this approach was promoted more widely.
For patients in need of a transplant, PSD is an opportunity to
actively improve their own situation, something they are arguably enti-
tled to do, given the costs and burdens of not gaining an organ.44
Those who do not have a suitable living-related donor are likely to
spend a long time on waiting lists, and in many cases also on dialysis.
Actively marketing and campaigning for oneself as a desirable target
for potential donors provides two potential benefits: one may obtain
the benefits of a transplant, and one also regains some sense of control
over one’s own destiny. This latter benefit may accrue regardless of
the outcome. Alternatively, however, it could result in a heightened
sense of abandonment, especially on dedicated sites where other
‘advertisers’ attract donors but one’s own efforts are unsuccessful. This
is, after all, a space where people are actively and openly competing for
a scarce resource and where efforts to help oneself (and not others)
are rewarded. PSD creates something of a ‘beauty contest’,45 where
patients put themselves in the shop window and potential donors are
not just free to choose whether to donate or not, but also able to
browse and choose a recipient on whatever grounds they like. This
may further the preferences of some donors, but also brings concerns
about justice into play. Although everyone waiting for a kidney may be
free to advertise, some patients are better placed and able to promote
themselves more effectively than others. This poses a greater ethical
challenge in some health systems than in others. For instance, in wel-
fare systems where transplant services and the allocation of organs are
run by the state, PSD may detract from the number of kidneys avail-
able to the general allocation pool. PSD disrupts the usual criteria that
balance clinical need, benefit, and waiting time. Instead kidneys may be
‘allocated’ according to distinctly non-medical factors, such as religion,
social value, and how photogenic the patients are. There are related
issues stemming from unequal access to social media, varying social
media savviness, and ability or otherwise to fund impressive and engag-
ing campaigns.
Two claims against this form of LKD can be posited, then:
1. It is wrong for people to choose recipients on the basis of non-
medical, or otherwise irrelevant criteria.
2. Allocation according to donors’ personal criteria will result in an
unjust allocation of organs, skewed in favour of those who, often
by luck alone, appeal to donors or who are able to market them-
selves most effectively.
In response to claim 1, much has been written on directed donation
within the context of deceased donation,46 and many of these argu-
ments can also be applied to living donation. One can grant that it is
generally preferable for organs to be allocated according to criteria
designed to promote fair access, but this does not in itself provide a
reason to prevent donations that can only be allocated according to
other criteria. Faced with the choice of allocating a kidney according to
potentially arbitrary criteria, or not having the kidney available for
transplantation at all, it is arguably wasteful to take the latter option.47
Living-related donation is also widely accepted, so directed donation is
not considered objectionable per se.
In response to claim 2, it is not yet clear what the impact of PSD will
be in countries which have centralized allocation systems. Given existing
evidence about the public’s preferences for organ allocation, where fac-
tors such as social value, moral deservingness, and past behaviours have
been found to feature,48 it is reasonable to assume that encouraging a
‘free market’ in charitable giving on social media has the potential to result
in significant inequalities of the kind that central allocations systems are
designed to prevent. Promoting and encouraging PSD would therefore
represent a risky strategy. Its potential to evoke empathy may result in
more living donations, but there is a significant risk that this will come at a
cost to the fairness of the allocation system, which, in turn, may under-
mine trust in the transplantation system. It is perhaps telling that coun-
tries that do permit PSD appear to tolerate rather than promote it.
Approach 3 Institutionally organized case study-based
campaigns to promote directed altruistic donation.
We have thus far explored two ways in which social media can be used
to elicit empathy and take advantage of the identifiable victim effect to
promote kidney donation. We will now consider a third approach that is
perhaps controversial but offers clear advantages over the other two
approaches. As far as we are aware, this approach is not currently used in
any country.
43Human Tissue Authority. (2017). Matching websites and social media.
Retrieved from https://www.hta.gov.uk/guidance-public/living-organ-dona-
tion/matching-websites-and-social-media
44Coupled with the fact that they may be attracting completely new donors
who are only prepared to donate to them, so nobody else is deprived of a
transplant that they might otherwise have got.
45Neidich et al., op. cit. note 42; Moorlock, op. cit. note 42.
46Moorlock, G., Ives, J., Bramhall, S., & Draper, H. (2015). Should we reject
donated organs on moral grounds or permit allocation using non-medical
criteria?: A qualitative study. Bioethics; Wilkinson. op. cit. note 18.
47Moorlock et al., op. cit. note 46.
48Boulware, L., Troll, M., Wang, N. Y., & Powe, N. (2007). Perceived trans-
parency and fairness of the organ allocation system and willingness to
donate organs: A national study. American Journal of Transplantation, 7(7),
1778–1787, Sander, S. L., & Miller, B. K. (2005). Public knowledge and atti-
tudes regarding organ and tissue donation: An analysis of the northwest
ohio community. Patient Education and Counseling, 58(2), 154–163, Tong,
A., Howard, K., Jan, S., Cass, A., Rose, J., Chadban, S., . . . Craig, J. C. (2010).
Community preferences for the allocation of solid organs for transplanta-
tion: A systematic review. Transplantation, 89(7), 796–805, Clark, M. D.,
Leech, D., Gumber, A., Moro, D., Szczepura, A., West, N., & Higgins, R.
(2012). Who should be prioritized for renal transplantation?: Analysis of key
stakeholder preferences using discrete choice experiments. BMC Nephrol-
ogy, 13(1), 1, Geddes, C. C., Rodger, R. S. C., Smith, C., & Ganai, A. (2005).
Allocation of deceased donor kidneys for transplantation: Opinions of
patients with ckd. American Journal of Kidney Diseases, 46(5), 949–956.
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We have argued that although PSD could result in additional
donors, promoting it via Approach 2 would involve a significant risk.
Approach 2 empowers donors and recipients, but in doing so it relin-
quishes control over important aspects of organ donation and alloca-
tion. Alternatively, transplant authorities could harness social media to
make direct appeals on behalf, and with the consent, of specific wait-
listed individuals selected according to similar principles used to allo-
cate organs in their jurisdiction, and bringing to bear for each selected
individual all of their sophisticated marketing resources. In doing so,
the benefits of social media are obtained without relinquishing control
over the aspects of donation and allocation that would make promoting
Approach 2 such a risk.
For instance, transplant authorities could promote only the stories
of urgent patients at the top of waiting lists, thereby increasing their
likelihood of receiving a transplant before they die or become too ill to
benefit from a transplant. Alternatively, they could promote those who
have waited, or are predicted to be waiting, a long time for a transplant,
such as patients of Black or Asian ethnic origin.49 A further option
could be to promote the cases of those involved in altruistic chains of
donation. Altruistic chains occur when Donor A is willing to donate to
Recipient A, but is instead only a match for Recipient B, who also has a
willing donor, Donor B, who is only a match for Recipient C. Finding
Donor X online, who is a match for Recipient A, can start a chain of
donations (Donor X to Recipient A, Donor A to Recipient B, Donor B
to Recipient C, and so on), which means that several otherwise incom-
patible donor/recipient pairs are able to receive and donate. These
chains often require a single donation to be ‘fed’ into the chain to cre-
ate a domino effect so that multiple patients receive transplants. The
decision on precisely what to prioritize is not central to our argument.
The salient point is that effort could be directed impartially and fairly
by harnessing the power of empathy evoked online to motivate dona-
tion. Although potential donors may feel empathy towards only certain
individuals and choose recipients according to criteria that are poten-
tially morally irrelevant, by ensuring that potential donors are exposed
to patients who meet the morally relevant criteria, the justice of the
allocation system need not be compromised.
This approach also allows financial resources to be used more
effectively. A significant problem with PSD is that it is sometimes used
to ‘find the needle in the haystack’ by patients who, for various medical
reasons (such as rare blood type, or Human leukocyte antigen [HLA]
sensitization),50 are particularly unlikely to find a suitable matching
donor. A single patient may attract tens of potential donors, each of
which would have to be tested for compatibility, even though the likeli-
hood would be that none of them was a suitable match. The resource
implications are significant, so transplant authorities could choose to
promote only the stories of patients who stand a good chance of find-
ing a match, thereby swiftly removing them from the waiting list.
Nevertheless, there would remain a chance that the system we pro-
pose might motivate many people to come forward as potential donors
only to find that they are not compatible with their preferred recipient.
These people may be lost to the donation system if they cannot help
their chosen recipient (and this would be an argument against this
approach if these were donors who, without PSD, may have been will-
ing to donate to a non-specified recipient). This would be undesirable
given that they have already shown willingness to debate and used
resources involved in tissue-typing. One solution to this would be to
develop a database, akin to that operated by Anthony Nolan in the
United Kingdom,51 where potential donor details and tissue-typing
results are stored. With appropriate consent, potential donors could
remain on this database and be notified when stories of patients with
whom they are a match are promoted. The potential donor would then
be free to choose whether they wanted to donate a kidney to this
patient. Detailed consideration of a living donor register is beyond the
scope of this article, so we raise it merely as one possible means of
keeping initially incompatible donors engaged with the possibility of
donating in the future.
By taking back control over advertising for LKD, transplant author-
ities would also be able to have greater control over the content of
advertisements for donors. Whereas there have been concerns about
the beauty contest created by PSD, an institutionally organized system
of LKD could ensure that only certain factors featured in the descrip-
tions of patients. Careful consideration would have to be given to pre-
cisely what things should be included in descriptions of patients, as it
will be necessary to balance privacy (by excluding extraneous personal
factors) with the effectiveness with which the promotion of the individ-
ual engages with the public and evokes empathy. Additionally, by con-
trolling the content of appeals, the authorities would be ensuring that
the content is accurate and not misleading to potential donors. This, in
turn, would limit the potential for exploitation on both sides, and help to
maintain public trust in the system. There is a possibility, however, that
institutionally organized campaigns could lose the ‘individuality’ that
appeals to some donors, or that too much ‘official’ institutional input
may deter some donors who want to donate outside of conventional
systems, so these considerations would have to be balanced carefully.
A further advantage of this approach is that it would be easier to
monitor communication between potential donors and recipients.
There have been concerns that the use of social media can be manipu-
lated to permit trade in organs, which is prohibited under the Declara-
tion of Istanbul.52 We have also suggested that they leave scope for
deception—as no one vets the veracity of the information provided by
recipients. At present, donors and recipients identified through social
media are able to contact each other through channels of their choice,
and it is extremely difficult to monitor and police this communication.
49This is a particular problem in the United Kingdom, but similar issues
occur in other countries with a history of immigration: Randhawa, G.
(2012). Renal health and transplantation: A focus on ethnicity. Journal of
Renal Care, 38(s1), 109–114.
50Sanfilippo, F. P., Vaughn, W. K., Peters, T. G., Shield, C. F., Adams, P. L.,
Lorber, M. I., & Williams, G. M. (1992). Factors affecting the waiting time of
cadaveric kidney transplant candidates in the united states. JAMA, 267(2),
247–252.
51Anthony Nolan. (2016). Anthony Nolan home page. Retrieved from
https://www.anthonynolan.org/
52Declaration of Istanbul. (2016). Declaration of Istanbul home page.
Retrieved from http://www.declarationofistanbul.org/
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Although websites such as matchingdonors.com report to relevant
authorities any discussions that mention payment, there is nothing to
stop users of the site exchanging other contact details and starting con-
versations about payment away from the main website. While it is
impossible to completely safeguard against payment, an institutionally
organized system could limit the sharing of contact details, and encour-
age communication solely through its own channels.
5 | OBJECTIONS
We can foresee several objections to Approach 3. First, by engaging
empathy to promote LKD, transplant authorities are arguably encour-
aging donation motivated by potentially irrelevant or morally suspect
criteria such as the recipients’ race, religious beliefs, or social status.
Motivation behind donation has been discussed at length in relation to
directed deceased donation, and it has been repeatedly argued that too
much emphasis is placed on impartial altruism as being the sole accept-
able motivator, and that, in any case, it is very difficult to be certain of
donors’ motivations.53 Moreover, one undesirable effect of suspect
motivation—the disruption of fair allocation—is mitigated by the use of
fair criteria to decide which cases are promoted. Thus, organs go where
they ‘should’ even if those giving them are indifferent, or even hostile,
to impartial allocation.
Second, there is still a risk that some sorts of people will benefit
more than others. As with PSD described in Approach 2, some patients
may be less likely to attract willing living donors than others. There
may, however, be significant direct benefit for all patients. Although a
specific campaign might not prove fruitful for those who are less ‘beau-
tiful’ in the sense implied by Neidich et al. and Moorlock, if Approach 3
results in additional donations overall, it will remove patients from wait-
ing lists. Having fewer patients on waiting lists improves the situation
for everyone remaining on the waiting list. Those featured in the cam-
paigns would still have access to organs’ normal channels. Therefore,
although Approach 3 may not benefit everybody equally, it may pro-
vide some benefit to everyone.54 It supports a more just allocation sys-
tem than PSD under Approach 2, which is already permitted.
Third, one might think it distasteful to have patients openly and lit-
erally competing with one another for resources. A Dutch television
programme caused controversy in 2007 when it showcased several
potential organ recipients and allowed viewers to vote on which patient
they felt should receive a transplant.55 The programme transpired to be
a hoax, produced with the intention of raising awareness of the organ
shortage, but it highlights the potential for negative public reactions.
The reality, however, is that potential recipients are already competing
with each other, whether actively or passively.56 Likewise, donors
already choose who receives transplants (in living-related donation, and
PSD), and therefore to some extent, are already choosing who lives and
who dies. It may be that state involvement in active competition is con-
sidered objectionable, but the state is already involved as it ultimately
facilitates and reaps the benefits of the donations and transplants that
currently arise from it. Moreover, our proposed system could side-step
some of the less appealing aspects of direct competition. For instance,
promoting only a single patient at a time (for a limited period of time,
say a week) would mean that potential donors would not be choosing
between several competing identifiable recipients. If it was still deemed
advantageous to promote several patients at the same time, careful
selection could ensure that direct competition was minimized, for
instance, by ensuring patients had different tissue-types.
A further issue is how Approach 3 could operate in conjunction
with Approach 2. It would be possible (albeit difficult) to only permit
Approach 3 and prohibit individuals from launching their own ‘inde-
pendent’ campaigns. This would, however, limit the scope for patients
to help themselves out of their own dire situations, and although this
could perhaps be justified, it may be viewed as a backward step in
countries that already permit Approach 2. It may also prove practically
difficult to monitor and prevent such campaigns, given the large and
often uncontrollable nature of the internet. It would be possible to
refuse to proceed with transplants arising from donors and recipients
matched via Approach 2,57 but turning away willing donors could be
considered a waste of potential benefit. Another option would be to
make patients’ access to Approach 3 conditional on them not attempt-
ing to solicit donors through independent channels.58 If Approach 3
could be demonstrated to be an effective way of recipients finding
donors, such a condition may result in Approach 2 becoming less popu-
lar. Some people may still choose independent channels over Approach
3, but if the institutionally organized campaign system was marketed as
the ideal and ‘official’ portal for finding potential organ recipients,
Approach 2 may also become less appealing to potential donors. Again,
we need not endorse a particular position here, other than to show
that there are different possibilities. Determining which option is pref-
erable requires empirical evidence, which is currently lacking.
6 | CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed three approaches to using social media to promote
organ donation. Approach 1 raises the fewest ethical issues, but is likely
to be least effective. Approach 2 is ethically problematic in some
respects, but is currently permitted in some countries. Despite it being
permitted, it is generally not actively promoted, possibly due to the
underlying ethical concerns, and the risks involved in leaving important
aspects of donation/allocation in the hands of individuals rather than
impartial organizations. Approach 3 is novel, and admittedly controver-
sial. It does, however, offer clear advantages over Approach 2 in terms
53Moorlock et al., op. cit. note 18. Saunders, op. cit. note 18.
54This approach may therefore provide a form of Pareto benefit. See, for
examples: Cohen, G. A. (1995). The pareto argument for inequality. Social
Philosophy and Policy, 12(1), 160–185. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Saunders, op. cit. note 18.
55BBC News. (2007). Outcry over TV kidney competition. Retrieved from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/6699847.stm
56Moorlock, op. cit. note 42.
57Anecdotally we have heard of donors and recipients matched through
certain dedicated websites being prevented from going ahead with
donation.
58We again thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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of preserving a relatively just allocation system and keeping various
aspects of the process under the control of transplant authorities. Fur-
ther research exploring responses to social media organ donation cam-
paigns, as well as motivations behind PSD, more generally would be
extremely helpful for establishing how our suggested approach could
be best used. We accept that establishing such a system could be
resource-intensive, and that ongoing costs may also be high, but these
costs should be considered against the ongoing cost of maintaining
patients waiting for transplants. The precise implementation of
Approach 3 would need careful consideration, but the important factor
is that these details remain under the control of transplant authorities.
Approach 3 appeals to empathy to do the motivating, but does so in a
way that minimizes disruption to desirable allocation policies. Approach
3, if implemented correctly, could increase rates of LKD without signifi-
cantly undermining the justice of kidney allocation.
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